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Abstract

The primary area of investigation of this work is the breakdown of the savings
and loan industry during the period between 1980 through 1994. The history of the
industry is traced from the early 1800's through the legislation of the New Deal into the
recessionary period of the early 1980's and subsequent deregulation. The collapse of the
industry cost United States taxpayers more than $130 billion making it the most
expensive public policy error on record. The primary sources of data for this work are the
reports of the U.S. government agencies involved in the cleanup and the monographs of
several key participants. In addition to the opinions of those either directly involved or
simply interested in the savings and loan debacle, a presidential commission reported on
the causes of the crisis. This thesis reviews and comments on those findings, but draws a
little noticed conclusion. The cleanup was a success. The Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) and the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC) unencumbered the
economy of $402 billion in overvalued and unproductive assets. The cleanup helped to
create a sound financial basis for the subsequent economic expansion. The RTC became a
model for several nations during the banking crisis that befell much of the Asian Rim in
the 1990's. Deregulation deserves continued debate, but two federal agencies merit credit
for alleviating a tremendous financial problem.
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List of Abbreviations

CEBA

Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987

DIDMCA

Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980

FDIC

Federal Depository Insurance Corporation

FHA

Federal Housing Administration

FHLBB

Federal Home Loan Bank Board

FHLBS

Federal Home Loan Bank System

FIRREA

Financial Institutions Refo� Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989

FSLIC

Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation

GAAP

General accepted accounting principles
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General Accounting Office

GSE

Government sponsored enterprise

RAP

Regulatory accounting principles
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Resolution Trust Corporation

S&L

Savings and Loan

The savings and loan crisis of 1980-1994 was the most expensive public policy
error in American history.Dogmatic support from Congress for the homeownership
industry allowed the structurally-flawed savings and loan segment to survive otherwise
lethal economic conditions.Rather than acknowledging the outmoded basis for the entire
business, Congress chose to keep the ailing industry on life support oxygenated with
taxpayer dollars.Legislative fixes to the problems presented by the higher interest rates
of 1980-1981 only served to increase the expense of the cleanup by nearly 800 percent.
Politicians, the media, and historians treat the S&L story as an infectious disease.Only
one of the three groups has good reason to avoid it.Ill-fated participants provided most of
the monographs about the disaster. The history of the S&L debacle lives in what C. Vann
Woodward described as "the twilight zone that lies between living memory and written
history ... one of the favorite breeding places ofmythology." 1 The accounts provided
typically end in the midst of the cleanup by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC).But
with the perspective of nearly a decade, other governments and market participants are
hailing the RTC as a model for treating ailing bank systems. Several nations have
constructed RTC agencies to solve their own desperately sick financial sectors. Some of
the heroes of the RTC were employed in Asia to provide leadership in guiding Asian
institutions back to a healthy financial status.The much-maligned RTC turns out to be a
story of success that needs to be told.
The successful response of the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
and the RTC led to the establishment of a sound-banking environment that lasted for
more than a decade.The causes of the crisis are many in number, and their review does
1
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result in the indictment of some political and financial institutions. But the decade
following the crisis witnessed the longest period of economic expansion in this century.
In addition, inflation plunged from its early 1980's level and the economy enjoyed a
stable price environment. Unemployment dropped to levels unseen in more than thirty
years, below what many critics thought was obtainable. The RTC earned an epitaph that
agencies should strive to achieve: it no longer exists because of the successful completion
of its mission.
The S&L industry was created to support the aspirations of Americans to own
their own homes. Many Americans formed an opinion of the local building and loan
based on the Frank Capra film, It's a Wonderful Life. The film quaintly, and in many
respects accurately, depicts the role and function of an S&L. The societal benefits of
homeownership are illustrated in a scene from the movie. George Bailey addresses the
board of directors and says of homeownership for the populace "doesn't it make them
better citizens, better customers?'' The homeownership industry is the largest in the U.S.
economy, however, because it provides benefits to the consumer as well as to society. In
defending the use of mortgages for the working class as a vehicle to obtain current
homeownership, George Bailey observes that members of the wage earning class "do
most of the working and paying and living and dying in this community. Well, is it too
much to have them work, live and die in a couple decent rooms and a bath?''
Savings and loan institutions developed as mutually owned organizations to help
members buy homes. The first savings and loan opened in the United States was the
Oxford Provident Building Association, established in Frankford, Pa. in 1831. It operated
as a mutually- owned institution, which meant deposits were pooled in order to fund

purchases of single-family homes.2 Of the original thirty-seven depositors, three were

3

Englishmen and they took the lead in modeling the S&L on the British building
societies. 3 The British building societies evolved from specializ.ation within the British
friendly societies. The friendly societies were neighborhood cooperative groups that
pooled resources. The collective monies served as financial aid for members if a wage
earner died or if accidents left members in financial difficulty. The Oxford Provident
Building and Loan members contributed funds until enough money was available to
purchase or build a new home. The individual members bid for the use of the pool and
the first loan granted was for $375, to a buy a home at 4276 Orchard Street in
Philadelphia.4 Within a year of operation, the Oxford Provident members utilized
appraisals on the properties acquired and required insurance to protect the value of the
loan on the home. A delegation from New York came to Frankford, Pa., inquired into the
operation of the building and loan, and returned to New York to open the second S&L,
the Brooklyn Building and Mutual Loan Association in 1836.5 The third operation was
opened in South Carolina in 1843 and from there institutions sprang up across most states
by the 1880's.
The unscrupulous activities of"national" S&L's resulted in the formation of a
lobby for the industry. In the 1880's more than two hundred ''national" associations
opened across the country using the building and loan name. The ''nationals" opened
2

James R Barth, The Great Savings and Loan Debacle, (Washington D.C.: The AEI Press, 1991) 9.

3

Leon T. Kendall, The Savings And Loan Business, (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962) 4.

4

Ibid.,

5

Ibid., 5.

branch offices to collect deposits and also solicited deposits through the mail. They
engaged in speculative schemes with little in common with the cooperative local
operations that focused on making mortgages. Irresponsible operators using the goodwill
of the industry would also be a twentieth-century occurrence. The depression of the
1890's virtually eliminated the nationals as lower real estate values coupled with
"immoderate expenses, questionable loans, and widely scattered and poorly controlled
operations" contributed to their demise.6 With the downfall of the ''nationals," the local
cooperatives banded together to create the U.S. League of Local Building and Loan
Associations. The League wanted an identity separate from the ''nationals" and wanted a
voice to communicate with national and state legislative bodies. This professional
organization shortly became the U.S. League of Savings Institutions. The League
developed into the lobbying organization for the industry and from its modest beginnings
in 1892 became one of the most powerful interest groups in Washington, D.C. In the
aftermath of the S&L debacle a hundred years later, the League's ability to influence
Congress and the administrations of Presidents Carter and Reagan earned it a
conspicuous spot in the lineup of factors that contributed to the cost of the cleanup.
Both in assets and number of members, the S&L industry grew rapidly in the
1920's. The League members had $125 million in mortgage loans outstanding in 1901. 7
That number grew nearly ten fold by 1923 when the members achieved $1 billion in
outstanding mortgages.8 In just the next four years the members of the League doubled
6

Ibid.,

1 Ibid., 6.
8
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outstanding mortgages to $2 billion. 9 The decade of the 1920's featured the peak for
quantity as the number of S&L's grew by nearly 50 percent from 8,633 to 12,342.10
The Great Depression forced a number of changes on the management of S&L's.
They found themselves in both the real-estate-liquidation and management business.
Foreclosures on homes soared from a pre-Depression national urban average of 75,000
annually to 273,000 in 1932. 11 The demand for cash rose unabated and loan defaults
continued. Mortgage foreclosures remained triple the level they had been before the
Depression with another 271,000 in 1933. 12 For the Depression era, mortgage
foreclosures averaged 231,000 per year. Many S&L's managed their properties through
the collection of rent and waited for more firm housing prices. The massive inventory of
foreclosed homes had a detrimental effect on the housing market because some homes
had to be sold. Homes were sold because the S&L' s struggled to maintain reserves for
their depositors seeking cash withdrawals. The managers of S&L's also dealt with a
housing industry, and the financial institutions that supported it, that was in a dramatic
decline. The League lost one third of its assets between 1930 and 1935. 13 Where they
existed at all, dividends from S&L operations were cut in half from their pre-Depression
levels of five to six percent. Members of failed S&L's were getting 70 to 80 cents on the
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dollar for their share of deposits. 14 That percentage was consistent with the amount
received by depositors at bank institutions that failed.
The creation of a central reserve system for savings institutions came from
President Hoover's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership in 1931. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Act of July 1932 established the Federal Home Loan Bank
System, which consisted of 12 regional Federal Home Loan Banks, the same number as
Federal Reserve Banks, under the supervision of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB). The FHLBB was constituted as an independent agency, but at times during its
existence it came under the direction of other agencies. The primary purpose of the new
system was similar to that of the Federal Reserve System. Both were charged with
providing member institutions with access to a reliable and steady source of funds. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board was to provide liquidity for its member institutions, thus
promoting homeownership without regard for disruptions in the financial markets. 15
Membership in the system included all federally-chartered S&L's and state-chartered
S&L's that opted into the system. Each of the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks was a
separate corporation with its stock privately held in the hands of the regional member
S&L's.
The Rooseveh administration continued to enact legislation in support of the
housing industry and the financial sector of the economy. The Banking Acts of 1933 and
193 5 determined the structure and character of commercial banking for the next 50 years.
The Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was created by the 1933 Banking
14
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Act and provided deposit insurance up to $2,500 for customers of participating banks.
The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Administration and
authorized the FHA to issue home mortgage insurance to protect lenders against
mortgage defaults. By assuming risk of default through the insurance, the FHA hoped to
stimulate mortgage lending by banks and S&L's. Congress expected the insurance would
entice lenders to reenter the mortgage market, with longer-term loans providing a
stimulus to the economically and politically important home building industry. To
support the S&L industry, $275 million in federal funds were deposited in 1,400 S&L's
across the country during the Depression. Most of the funds came from the operations of
the Home Owners Loan Corporation, but some were direct U.S. Treasury deposits. 16
The National Housing Act contained two other key provisions. It placed the
responsibility for issuing charters and regulating the operations of federal S&L's with the
FHLBB. The second provision was the creation of the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to insure deposits with federally chartered S&L's. The
savings industry was on the same footing as the banks, but with a key difference that
would exacerbate problems during the debacle 50 years later. The S&L industry had the
issuance of charters, regulation of operations, and the insurance functions all reporting to
one agency, the FHLBB. The potential for conflict among those functions evidently
passed unnoticed until the problems of the 1980's hit the industry.
The Great Depression took a tremendous toll on the financial sector of the
economy. During the 1930's, a total of 1,706 S&L's failed, costing depositors $200

16
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8
million. 17 In June 1929, there were 24,504 commercial banks in operation in the U.S. By
the national banking holiday of March 1933, only 11,878 commercial banks were open. 18
A few of the banks merged or were purchased, but nearly 9,000 banks failed, wiping out
$1.34 billion in deposits. 19 But the legislation of the New Deal era made apparent the
federal government's public policy of supporting the homeownership industry. The
efforts of the federal government to support homeownership transformed the market for
home mortgages. Tax law changes allowed the deductibility of home-mortgage interest,
creating a tax benefit for homeowners that soon came to be considered politically
sacrosanct. Few industries enjoyed the tax benefits of the homeownership sector, but no
industry was as large as the homeownership sector. By virtue of its size, the
homeownership industry received attention from elected officials. More importantly, the
industry represents a fundamental American value. In It's a Wonderful Life, George
Bailey's father lectured him on the role S&L's play in the desire of Americans to own
their homes: "I feel in a small way we are doing something important. Satisfying a
fundamental urge. It is deep in the race for a man to want his own roof and walls and
fireplace and we're helping him get those things in our shabby little office."

17
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Between 1934 and 1979, the S&L industry enjoyed a period of prosperity. The
post-Depression years saw a remarkable decline in the number of S&L failures. From
1934 to 1979, only 13 S&L's failed and another 130 had assisted mergers. 20 The total
expense for these closures was $306 million, all of which came from the member-funded
FSLIC. S&L's experienced tremendous growth in the post-World War II period. Assets
held by S&L's totaled $10 billion in 1946. That number expanded to $130 billion by
1965 for a 14 percent annual growth rate, dwarfing the five percent annual growth rate of
bank assets for the same period. 21 The legislatively-mandated structure of the S&L
industry gave it significant advantages in the stable and low interest-rate environment of
the post-World War II period. S&L's enjoyed a complete waiver of federal income taxes.
They were exempted from Regulation Q, which capped what depository institutions
could pay on deposit balances. The notion of the ''three-six-three" bank officer became
engrained in the public perception of banks and S&L's: take in money at three percent,
lend it out in the form of mortgages at six percent, and be on the golf course by three
o'clock. But just like the golf course, the S&L industry was no place to be when the black
clouds of the coming economic storm gathered on the horizon.
Financial prosperity in the post-war period came to a wrenching close with the
economic turmoil of the 1970's. President Lyndon B. Johnson's spending for the Great
Society programs and the Vietnam War brought inflation into the economy. The
inflationary pressures forced President Richard M. Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods
fixed-exchange rate system for currencies in 1971. The suspension of convertibility of
20

E. White 781.

21
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currency to gold ushered in the age of flexible exchange rates, which increased volatility
in the markets. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 pushed inflation higher. A steep recession
hit the economy in 1973 and gave policymakers an unprecedented combination of
economic contraction and rising prices. The combination of inflation and high interest
rates hampered the economy into the next decade. The rise and the increased volatility in
interest rates that came with the 1970's and early 1980's is depicted on the U.S. Prime
Rate chart in the appendix. 22
Beneath the surface of the economic storm, an enormous transfer of wealth took
place. Because of the demand for housing from the Baby-Boom generation and the rise in
prices associated with inflation, homeowners of the 1960's and early 1970's experienced
a rapid increase in the value of their homes. The debt supporting that increased value was
typically a 30-year mortgage fixed at five to eight percent, which was carried on the
books of an S&L as an asset. Higher interest rates pushed down the value of existing
mortgages held by S&L's. The reason for this loss of value was that credit markets did
not pay the full face value for an asset, a loan made by an S&L, which produced a six
percent income stream when new mortgages paid the S&L' s nine percent. The price of
the lower-yielding mortgage had to be reduced below its face value to reflect the
diminished worth of its income stream. So while the homeowner enjoyed appreciation in
the value of his home, the S&L lost value on the corresponding mortgage.
The transfer of wealth from lenders to borrowers might have been sustainable if
the net worth and reserves of S&L's had been sufficient to last until interest rates

22
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dropped. But, according to economist Eugene White, the "silent transfer of wealth from
23

institutions to home owners gradually undermined the industry."24 The value of the
existing mortgage assets had dropped so much because of the higher interest rates that the
liabilities, which were deposits, exceeded the value of the assets, which were loans. In the
S&L industry, net worth reflected the difference in the values of deposits and loans. If the
S&L industry had priced all of its assets at their market value in 1980, the industry would
have shown a negative net worth of $17 .5 billion. 25 The value of their liabilities exceeded
the value of their assets by that amount. The number seemed incomprehensible in 1980
but would only get much bigger, albeit for different reasons, in the next decade.
With mortgage interest rates headed for 20 percent, the industry resorted to the
one strength it always had--compliant politicians. When Congress supported and
President Jimmy Carter signed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), S&L' s got the relief they were looking for:
authorization to engage up to 20 percent of their assets in commercial real estate lending,
consumer lending, investments in commercial paper and corporate debt securities. The
federally-chartered S&L's also shed geographic restrictions on lending and asset
gathering and were allowed to engage in statewide branches. Another key provision was
the replacement of the five-percent-net-worth requirement. This requirement forced
owners of S&L's to have some of their money invested in the thrift. The language of
DIDMCA allowed the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to adopt a sliding scale of three
23
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24
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to six percent net worth relative to deposits. The amount of deposits insured against loss
was raised by DIDMCA from $40,000 to $100,000. The passage of DIDMCA provided
for the phase out of Regulation Q ceilings on interest rates paid on deposits. All of these
changes played a role in the subsequent S&L failures.
The passage of DIDMCA was the first major step in the deregulation of financial
institutions. The business structure of S&L's was put in place by legislation enacted in
the deflationary 1930's and it was ill-equipped to handle the inflation of the 1970's and
1980's. Left to the free markets in the interest rate squeeze of 1980 and 198 1, the S&L
industry might have disappeared or at a minimum shrunk in number to just those
associations best able to manage expenses. In its continued commitment to the
homeownership industry, Congress passed DIDMCA to relieve the S&L's of the business
structure that was forcing them into staggering losses.
The momentum toward deregulation received a boost when President Ronald
Reagan and his administration took the reins in 198 1. The signature legislation of the
early Reagan administration was the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198 1, which
provided an enormous stimulus to the commercial construction business. The act reduced
the depreciation schedule on commercial buildings from 40 years to 15 years. This rapid
depreciation created "paper" losses that individual taxpayers used to offset income from
other sources. The net effect was a large tax incentive to construct commercial buildings
just as the S&L industry got the green light to engage in commercial lending. 26 The race
to build commercial buildings with S&L deposits was about to start.
26
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The S&L' s received two more acts of encouragement to stimulate lending.
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Richard T. Pratt, a proponent of deregulation and President Reagan's choice to serve as
Federal Home Loan Bank Board chairman, drafted the Garn-St.Germain Depository
Institutions Act to help the S&L industry keep pace with other depository institutions.
The act doubled to 40 percent the assets that S&L's could invest in commercial lending,
commercial paper, and corporate debt securities. The S&L' s were expected by
accountants and regulators to maintain a positive difference between the value of the
loans or assets compared to the value of deposits or liabilities. That positive difference
was referred to as the net worth of the S&L. Under Pratt, the FHLBB adopted the
minimum net worth requirement established by DIDMCA of three percent and further
eased the application of that requirement by redefining the measure of net worth. The
FHLBB shifted from general accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to the much more
lenient regulatory accounting principles (RAP). Under RAP, the S&L's sold assets at a
loss but amortized the loss over ten years and carried the remaining unamortized value as
an asset on their balance sheet even though the asset had been sold. The effect was to
lower further the net worth necessary for S&L's to be considered solvent. The change in
net worth requirements also lowered the capital necessary to apply for an S&L charter.
The greatly reduced capital requirements exponentially increased the universe of
potential owners. In addition, the FHLBB eliminated a requirement of at least 400
shareholders to open an S&L. The FHLBB allowed and encouraged single business
entities and individuals to apply for an S&L charter. In a period when market conditions
dictated a reduction of capacity, Pratt approved the issuance of additional charters. The
Pratt Board also removed any restrictions on the gathering of assets by S&L's, which

14
allowed the industry to work with Wall Street investment firms to raise deposits through
brokered certificates of deposit.
The individual state agencies responsible for regulation and issuance of state S&L
charters watched the Pratt-led Federal Home Loan Bank Board with great interest. The
state legislatures were willing to follow the lead of the federal authorities because they
were also benefactors of S&L largesse. With the industry pumping campaign
contributions into the state legislature, the state of California issued 215 charters for new
S&L's in 400 days. 27 In a report drafted by the FDIC after the debacle, the agency
reported that the states endorsed and copied the FHLBB actions in what would become a
competition in laxity of regulation. 28 The profligate creation of S&L's contributed greatly
to the expense of the cleanup.
The first stage of the S&L debacle came to a close with the relief brought by a
drop in interest rates in 1982. The damage incurred up to 1982 was the result of the
structure of the S&L's business that required them to pay high interest rates for short
term deposits while their assets were long-term mortgages that returned lower rates of
interest. This money-losing predicament is known as "borrowing short and lending long."
A free market economy would have shrunk the industry because S&L' s unable to reduce
costs or draw on additional infusions of capital would have failed. The homeownership
industry and its political servants were, however, unwilling to allow market forces to take

27
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their toll on the S&L 's. 29 The steps taken by the Carter and Reagan administrations,

15

Congress, and the FHLBB insured the temporary survival of the industry, but with
consequences that were expensive and largely unforeseen. William Seidman served as
chairman of the FDIC in the administration of President George Bush and he described
the action of the parties that saved the S&L industry in the early 1980's: "in deadly
concert, the lobbyists for the S&L industry, the Democratic congressional partisans of
federal help for housing at any price, and the ideologues of the Reagan administration
concocted a witch's brew of misguided policy."30
The second stage of the debacle began in late 1982 after the passage of the
deregulation bills and the decision of the FHLBB to relax regulatory standards. The
introduction of less qualified owners and management teams into an industry that already
had too much capacity proved to be ruinous. 31 With an S&L charter and a million dollar
investment, owners could gain access to more than $30 million in assets. S&L assets
grew at twice the rate ofbanks between 1982 and 1985. 32 To keep up with the demand
for construction loans brought on by the accelerated depreciation schedule in the 1981
Tax Act, the S&L' s turned to Wall Street to get huge blocks of deposits by selling S&L
issued, and FSLIC-insured, certificates of deposit. To make matters easier for the
industry, the FHLBB lifted geographic limits on lending so S&L's were truly ''nationals"

29
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again. 33 One hundred years later, the industry had come full circle to be composed
heavily of "national lending companies."
In the new deregulation environment, the S&L's were permitted and even
encouraged to move into business activities for which they had neither experience nor
understanding. 34 For 150 years they collected deposits and made mortgage loans to
homebuyers. The character of the Bailey Building and Loan in It 's A Wonderful Life
commemorated the nature of their business. But commercial lending requires more
complicated underwriting procedures with different kinds of analysis. Wall Street's
introduction of corporate debt, particularly junk bonds, to the portfolios of S&L's led the
institutions further away from their area of expertise.
Rather than pass further deregulation in an attempt to save the S&L's, Congress
could have shut down the industry in late 1982. The FSLIC had $6.3 billion in reserves at
the end of 1982. An estimated $25 billion was necessary to close the insolvent S&L's that
were still operating and incurring greater losses. The shortfall of $18. 7 billion would have
been a bargain compared to the eventual cost. Lawrence White, a member of the FHLBB
in the 1980's, believed the opportunity passed because the FHLBB was largely unaware
of the extent of the destructive processes that the unbalanced economic deregulation had
encouraged. 35 The FHLBB observed falling interest rates, and the industry showed some
profits after two years of severe losses, so the FHLBB assumed that the industry had
recovered. The agency charged with regulating the industry was unaware of the forces
33
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34
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35
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they unleashed and unaware of the damage those forces were causing. As William
Seidman observed, "economic activities can be disciplined by the marketplace or they
can be brought into order by government fiat. But in the S&L situation, neither imposed
order."36
Lawrence White wrote that there was "no Cassandra" in the early 1980' s warning
about the "extreme dangers" that could follow passage of deregulation. 37 On more than
one occasion, thou� none other than FHLBB chairman Richard Pratt wondered out loud
what. might come from the combination of deregulation and relaxation of standards. In
December 1982, Pratt told a banking group that deregulation had invited the S&L
industry to engage in "risky activities. "38 In a report to the two congressional banking
committees, Pratt admitted that he initially failed to see the moral hazard presented by the
presence of deposit insurance. 39 The risk was that operators of insolvent S&L's would
gamble the insured deposits on speculative investments in the hope that they would make
enough money to become profitable. If their investment decisions led to more losses, the
FSLIC had to bail out the depositors. The owners of insolvent S&L's had nothing to lose
by taking greater risk. Congress failed to act on the warning.
The financial health of the S&L industry continued to deteriorate. In March 1985,
the FHLBB levied a special assessment against the deposits of its members to raise funds
for the rapidly depleting FSLIC. The special assessment, about which the members
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vehemently complained to Congress, raised one billion dollars for FSLIC. The FSLIC
used all of those one billion dollars to handle nine S&L's liquidations and 22 placements
of insolvent S&L's with healthier institutions. The use of the special assessment to settle
3 1 insolvent institutions was no victory for the FSLIC, because by the end of 1985, 130
S&L institutions were insolvent as measured by the very liberal regulatory accounting
principles. 40 The FSLIC was in serious financial trouble and no longer able to self fund
its liabilities.
The economic environment for S&L's got worse when the Tax Reform Act of
1986 eliminated accelerated depreciation on commercial real estate. The tax law changes
helped precipitate a decline in real estate values. By 1989 the aggregate value of office
buildings in the U.S. had fallen 15 percent. 41 The effects were striking on a regional
basis: the value of office buildings in the South collapsed 40 percent from 1984 through
1989. 42 New construction of commercial property virtually ceased and the value of the
assets supporting the loans made by S&L's fell. Many of the S&L's were lending 100
percent of the cost of construction for commercial buildings and reporting fees for
making the loans when the deals were approved. This showed increased fee and revenue
income, but return on assets and return on equity plummeted as loan payments became
overdue.
Even in the midst of a worsening situation in the mid-1980's, the S&L's and their
supporters in Congress refused to acknowledge the crisis. The FSLIC needed more funds
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to resolve the growing number of insolvent S&L's and a program to provide $15 billion
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to recapitalize the FSLIC was presented to Congress in April 1986. The S&L industry
denounced the program and its lobbyists implored Congress to vote it down and to relax
the minimal regulatory practices in place. Jim Wright, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, ignored the bill and the S&L's continued their profligate ways.43 Edwin
Gray had replaced Pratt as chairman of the Fl-ll.,BB in 1983 and he recognized the
severity of the situation. Gray pushed the FHLBB to raise the amount of capital owners
needed to have in the thrifts and to reverse the lax policies of the Pratt administration. But
the S&L lobby successfully delayed action on the FSLIC recapitaliz.ation plan for the
balance of 1986. By the end of 1 986, the number ofinsolvent S&L' s, by even the liberal
RAP standards, had nearly doubled to 255.44 In January 1 987, the FSLIC recapitalization
plan was reintroduced in both houses of Congress and was met with the same lack of
urgency. Gray told Congress that the FSLIC needed $24 billion immediately and the
GAO reported that $20 billion was necessary to recapitalize the FSLIC.45 The response
by Congress was the passage of the Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA) in the
summer of 1 987, which reflected congressional ignorance about both the severity of the
crisis as well as the liability of the government. CEBA funded $1 0.875 billion for the
FSLIC but capped annual expenditures to $3.875 billion. The money appropriated was
woefully short of what was needed to insure depositors against any loss from continued
activities of the S&L's. Congress clearly allowed the opinion of the S&L lobby to
43
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override the recommendations of the federal regulators. In treating the deposit liability as

government expenditures subject to the budget approval process, Congress confused or
ignored its obligation as insurer of deposits. 46
In 1989, the growing size of the problem and the initial publicity from the crisis
finally shook Washington from its S&L daze. The incoming administration of President
George Bush took action with the introduction and passage of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989. The FIRREA completely
restructured the S&L industry. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the FSLIC were
dissolved. In their place, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Board to oversee
lending activities of member institutions. The new Office of Thrift Supervision served as
primary regulator of the S&L industry and issued charters under the guidance of the U.S.
Treasury Department. The insurance of S&L deposits was transferred to the FDIC. The
responsibility of disposing of insolvent S&L' s and their assets went to the newly created
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), which reported to the FDIC. The FIRREA provided
$50 billion to deal with the costs of disposing of the failed S&L's. The FIRREA

mandated higher net worth standards for thrifts that brought them in line with standards
for nationally-chartered banks. The FIRREA restricted the lending and investment
activities of state-chartered S&L' s to the activities permitted for federally-chartered
S&L's. Federally-chartered S&L's could no longer buy junk bonds and had to divest their
junk bond holdings by July 1, 1994. Federal S&L's had to match national bank standards
with regard to several underwriting guidelines, and lending on commercial real estate was
tied to the amount of capital owners had in their thrifts.
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Many believed that the FIRREA took unfair aim at the FfilBB and regulators
responsible for the industry. Lawrence White called the passage ofFIRREA an "act of
anger" by the Bush administration and Congress.47 The FIRREA scattered the functions
of the FfilBB and the FSLIC. Those in charge of the agencies and their employees were
left to seek employment with the new agencies. Perhaps more importantly, passage of
FIRREA also marked the end of the nearly unlimited influence of the S&L lobby. The
lobby was still powerful enough to portray the government, in part through the activities
of the RTC, as the culprit in the massive cleanup that followed. But the ability of the
S&L lobby to "own Congress" evaporated as expenses for the cleanup rose, and evidence
of fraud and incompetence on the part of S&L operators became public information.48
The creation of the RTC involved putting together a management structure that
pleased Congress, the Bush administration, the FDIC, and Treasury Department. As the
chairman of the FDIC, Seidman referred to the "bureaucratic warfare" that took place in
creating FIRREA and implementing the bill as a "good example of how badly
Washington can work.',49 The first president of the RTC Oversight Board resigned within
months of accepting the job because of the "irrational" organizational structure.50 The
new regulatory body incorporated provisions of FIRREA that replaced modes of
operation used since the National Bank Act of 1864 and the Banking Acts of 1933 and

47

Ibid., 1 80.

48

Mayer, 32.

49

Seidman, 199.

so Ibid., 202-205.

22
1935. The regulators had neither the funds nor the directive to address the mounting S&L
failures , and no significant action to staunch the losses was taken during 1989. 5 1
The RTC eventually operated as conservator and receiver of insolvent S&L's.
From its inception in December 1989 until its closure in 1995 , the RTC handled 747
insolvent S&L's. 52 The conservatorship program managed 706 of the total 747 thrifts. As
conservator , the RTC took control of operations from an insolvent thrift and the S&L
remained open. Most of these failed thrifts , 497 institutions , were handled through
purchase and assumption transactions. These transactions allowed healthy :financial
institutions , and in a few instances nonfinancial companies , to acquire failed thrifts from
the RTC. In most of these transactions , the acquiring institution assumed all of the failed
S&L's deposits , including uninsured deposits , and took possession of some of the assets.
In 158 of the 747 insolvencies , the RTC brokered a transfer of deposits to a healthy
insured depository institution. If the RTC was unable to find a buyer for a thrift , the RTC
resorted to a payoff of deposits. Only in 92 instances did the RTC directly pay depositors.
The RTC functioned primarily as a sales organization. In addition to satisfying the
obligation of insuring deposits at failed S&L's , the RTC disposed of$402 billion in
assets held by insolvent thrifts. 53 Most of the assets held by thrifts were mortgages. The
RTC became a market leader in structuring "securitized" mortgage pools. The securitized
pools allowed the RTC to sell an unprecedented volume of mortgages. Insurance
companies , mutual funds , and brokerage firms purchased the pools for the income created
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predictable income from the mortgages to meet their own liabilities. The RTC also dealt
with the legacy of deregulation, as it became the owner of casinos, fast food franchises,
ski resorts, windmill farms, and junk bonds. The disposal of these assets captured the
attention of the public, but most of the losses incurred by the RTC came from selling
commercial real estate. 54
The Bush administration and Congress turned on their old friends in the S&L
lobby and publicly insisted that the RTC prosecute cases against the owners of the
S&L's. 55 Many of the professional liability lawsuits were brought against members of the
boards of directors of the failed S&L's. The RTC brought professional liability lawsuits
against the accountants and lawyers that had advised thrifts in 444 of the 747 failed
institutions. 56 The recoveries of these lawsuits were included in the $5 billion recovered
by the FDIC in professional liability actions. 57 Separate legal actions brought another
billion dollars from a settlement with Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert for
their activities in the junk bond market.58 Milken used a variety of illegal techniques to
keep junk bonds flowing into S&L' s. His trading desk often swapped junk bond
portfolios between different S&L's at fictitiously high prices, which allowed the
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institutions to post gains on the trades and establish higher values for other junk bonds.
The salespeople at Drexel also offered illegal incentives to the managers at S&L's in
order to motivate them to buy more junk bonds on behalf of the S&L.
More than one billion dollars came from settlements with accounting firms that
approved financial statements for insolvent S&L's. 59 The "Big Six" accounting firms
audited more than one thousand failed banks and S&L's during the crisis. The potential
claims by the federal agencies exceeded both the value of some of the accounting firms
and the value of their liability insurance coverage. When contemplating what action to
take, the FDIC considered that it had already incurred more than $35 million in outside
counsel costs in a separate legal proceeding against Ernst & Young for that firm's audits
of several banks in Tennessee owned by the Butcher family. In 199 1 , after nine months
of a trial and still no verdict, the FDIC and Ernst & Young brokered an agreement
covering both the liability associated with the Butcher banks and all liability associated
with banks and thrifts that failed during the debacle. Several other "Big Six" firms
expressed an interest in turning the settlement into a universal agreement for all liability
associated with the S&L debacle. Ernst & Young, Arthur Anderson, KPMG Peat
Marwick, and Deloitte & Touche each paid more than $100 million to avoid accounting
malpractice claims based on "a clear and unambiguous breach of the duty to perform a
,
competent audit in compliance with GAAP. ,6o
The public and shareholders received far less protection from accountants than
they expected. Investors and the financial community rely on the objectivity and integrity
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of certified public accountants to insure the orderly exchange of information regarding
commerce. In performing their duties as auditors, accountants are subjected to the
competing interests of the client, the client's lenders, government agencies, investors, and
the public. But of these competing interests, only the client pays the accountants for their
work. In particular, once the leading public accounting firms started accepting consulting
fees, they opened themselves up to scrutiny regarding the objectivity of their audit work.
One can easily imagine a staff meeting taking place at one of the major accounting firms
when the audit team tells the consulting people, who are often being paid three or four
times as much in fees as the auditors, that the auditors will have to go public with the
news that the client's balance sheet is troubling. It would be naive to doubt that pressure
would be placed on the auditors to reinterpret the status of the client's balance sheet.One
of the most subjective processes in an audit of a lending institution is the assessment of
loans to determine their value as assets. There is often enough room for interpretation by
accountants to overstate the value of a loan, especially when being encouraged to do so
by the management of a lending institution. Because accountants are mainly responsive
to the bank's management, shareholders--and in the S&L case, taxpayers--have enormous
liabilities and less protection than they thought.
The financial cost of the S&L debacle made it the most expensive public policy
error in American history. The estimated cost ofprotecting the depositors was $160
billion dollars.The surviving S&L institutions provided $28 billion of the $160 billion in
losses, leaving $132 billion for U.S. taxpayers.61 The final tab for the RTC was $86
billion of that total. The FSLIC incurred the other $46 billion after exhausting its
61
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insurance funds. The $132 billion owed by taxpayers has already been paid to S&L
depositors. The price tag was nearly $2,000 for the average American household of four
people. The actual expense will be higher because the government had to go into debt to
pay those funds and thus additional interest expenses will be incurred. Some estimates for
the total cost of the S&L debacle reach as high as $8,000 for the average American
family. 62
The S&L debacle had a human toll as well. Those senators and congressmen
tempted by campaign contributions received most of the notoriety. Senators John
McCain, Dennis DeConcini, John Glenn, Alan Cranston, and Donald Riegle accepted
campaign funds from Charles Keating and interceded on his behalf with regulators
investigating the activities of Lincoln Savings, thus earning the characterization as the
"Keating Five." When Keating's illegal business practices became public, several of his
benefactors returned campaign contributions and distanced themselves from the
proceedings. Senators Timothy Wirth, William Armstrong, Mack Mattingly , and Chic
Hecht also received contributions from Keating but avoided much of the media glare.63
James Wright, Speaker of the House of Representatives, was one of the most brazen
advocates for the S&L industry. The congressman from Texas received campaign
contributions from a number of S&L owners and interceded on their behalf with
regulators. Many of those S&L owners eventually found themselves subjects of criminal
proceedings regarding their management of those thrifts. A special counsel recommended
to the Ethics Committee of the House that Wright be charged with violations for
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his congressional seat and position as Speaker of the House in 1989.
A long list of famous and infamous people came in contact with the S&L
business. The politicians, and businessmen convicted of crimes like Charles Keating,
Michael Milken, and Ivan Boesky received most of the attention, but others achieved
notoriety. President George Bush undoubtedly suffered on many fronts because of his son
Neil's involvement with the wrongdoers at Silverado Savings and Loan. In February of
1985, Alan Greenspan, as a private citizen, wrote a letter to the FHLBB on behalf of
Charles Keating, hailing Lincoln's management team as having an outstanding track
record in direct investments.64 Long before he successfully prosecuted Microsoft and Bill
Gates and lost a recount for Al Gore, David Boies represented the government in the
S&L cases against Michael Milken. 65 The list of people involved is longer than the list of
reasons why the debacle took place.
In 1993, President Bill Clinton and Congress created the National Commission on
Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, which was instructed to
examine the causes of the problems in the S&L industry that led to the passage of
FIRREA The Commission characterized the government response of FIRREA as "too
much, too late. ,,66 The Commission on FIRREA reported the existence of depository
insurance as the fundamental condition for the debacle, which was seemingly obvious but
noteworthy. Only with the existence of deposit insurance did taxpayers become liable for
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losses incurred by the S&L industry. But with virtually no support to remove deposit
insurance , the Commission looked to identify contributing factors. Other findings of the
Commission focused on regulatory changes promulgated by the Pratt-led FHLBB. The
Commission found that "it is difficult to overstate the destructive effect of the regulatory
actions that weakened net worth standards in an environment in which S&L's could
expand their insured deposit liabilities at will.',67 In his review of the actions by the Pratt
led FHLBB , the journalist Martin Mayer concluded that "more than any other single
action by the Bank Board , the approval of accounting [changes] made the collapse of the
,
industry inevitable. ,6S
Much of the blame for the debacle resides with Congress and its dogged support
of the homeownership industry. Between 1980 and 1994 , while the FSLIC and RTC
resolved 1 2, 97 insolvent thrifts at a cost to taxpayers of$132 billion , the FDIC resolved
1 ,617 banks that failed , or were failing at interdiction , at no cost to taxpayers. Despite
covering more failed institutions , albeit with a smaller asset base , the FDIC paid the
entire deficit for depositors from its self-funded insurance. The S&L industry was
allowed to lose billions because Congress maintained a policy of supporting the housing
industry at literally any cost. The members of Congress treated banking committees as
housing committees. 69 Housing is one of the few industries with both a voting and
political fund-raising constituency. Most other industries can deliver only one of the
sources of sustenance for the politicians. Every vote for housing was a safe vote. The
61

Ibid., 36.

68

Mayer, 84.

69

Ibid., 9 1 .

S&L lobby learned from the start that the place to be in Washington was under the

29

housing tent and not the banking tent. The S&L' s could deliver enormous sums of cash to
the state and national politicians, as shown by the $900,000 given to Senator Alan
Cranston by Keating's institutions. 70 The National Commission on FIRREA documented
a number of proposals that came before Congress in the years prior to the climb in
interest rates that, if enacted, might have avoided the debacle. 7 1 Every bill was defeated
by the influence of the S&L lobby and the dedication of Congress to housing. The
combination of a vote for such a fundamental American value as housing coupled with
the flow of money from the S&L lobby was far too powerful a force for Congress to
resist.
Nearly all of the commentators on the S&L debacle end the story here with an
appraisal of the damage and a search for causes. There is, however, an important epilogue
that needs to be told. The actions taken by the Bush administration, Congress, and the
reluctant industry did clear the insured depository institutions of much of their overvalued
assets. The RTC sold or disposed of $402 billion in assets. The effect on the financial
sector of the economy was to free the lenders' balance sheets of the largely overvalued or
under-productive assets. The surviving :financial institutions were therefore poised to fuel
an economic rebound that few envisioned. Of the critics writing on the S&L debacle, few
found any positive ramifications from the cleanup. Only Seidman foresaw ''that the
United States is about to enter what I predict will be the most successful economic period

70

Ibid., 201.

71

National Commission, 27.

30
in its history."72 An assortment of factors came together to spur the U.S. economy to
recover from the recession of 1991. Perhaps the least acknowledged was the purging
effect of the activities undertaken by the RTC.
The financial market media started reporting in 1993 that the RTC might bring
positive consequences for the financial sector and the overall economy. In September
1993, United States Banker waded through the "reflexive" criticisms of the agency to
find a success story unfolding and reported a "slew of impressive accomplishments. "73
United States Banker dismissed RTC's most vociferous critics as people with "huge axes

to grind." The primary finding of the article was that RTC had "boosted a moribund real
estate market, pioneered bulk asset sales and commercial mortgage securitiz.ation-and
taught the private sector a trick or two."74 Two weeks after the RTC closed operations in
December 1995, Business Week reported that the agency's epitaph should be ''It
Worked."75 The magazine asserted that the RTC "established a floor for the moribund
real estate market and dispelled a cloud that could have weighed down the economy for a
decade."76
By the mid-1990's, observers compared the positive resuhs of the RTC's actions
to the tepid response taken by Japan. The circumstances in Japan were the resuh of an
inflation of real estate and financial assets that stemmed from a decade of profligate
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assets that had collapsed in value. Between 1990 and 2000, overall real estate values in
Japan dropped by more than 60 percent.77 During this same time period, commercial real
estate in Tokyo lost 75 percent of its value. 78 By 1996, Japan had an estimated $800
billion in bank assets that were in fact worthless.79 The Economic Times ofIndia reported
that for ten years, the government in Japan engaged a number of"quick fixes" that failed
to address the structural deficiencies of''the mighty Japanese machine [that] is now fallen
low. "80 Until property tied up in bad loans or hidden as security on the bank balance
sheets was cleared, Japan's economy promised to remain in crisis. In 1999 Japan sought
the help of William Seidman, who pushed authorities to employ the tactics used by the
RTC and FDIC to resolve the financial crisis in the U.S.8 1 The Japanese undertook some
changes recommended by Seidman, but Japan's politicians continued to resist a purge of
bank assets. The bank assets needed to be discounted to their market value in order to
find buyers. The shortfall created by the discounts, like the $132 billion shortfall in the
U.S., would have to be covered by the Japanese taxpayer, but Japan's politicians feared
"a public outcry." At the beginning of the new century, the Japanese economy still lacked
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the "catalytic role" played by the RTC in order to clear away the debt's drag on the

economy. 82
Japan's insolvent banking system gained a lot of company in the winter of 199798 when the Asian currency crisis spilled over into the economies of the "Asian Tigers."
Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Indonesia, and China experienced a collapse of asset values as
funds were withdrawn from their currency markets. The drop in value of real estate and
financial assets left the banks of the Asian Tigers in the same predicament as Japan's
banks. Rather than follow Japan and employ half measures, Korea took the lead in
creating an Asset Management Corporation modeled on the RTC. 83 The successful
operation of the RTC fashioned agency contributed to the recovery of the Korean
economy. With the benefit of the U.S. and Korean experience, Thailand created the
Financial Sector Restructuring Authority to play the same role as the RTC and disposed
of $22 billion in nonperforming assets. 84 In November 2000, Taiwan announced the
creation of an institution "similar to the RTC" to auction bad loans held by Taiwan's
banks. 85 The central government of China adopted "the model of America's RTC" to
remove accumulated bad debt from the balance sheets of China's banks. 86 The quick
acceptance by the Asian Tigers of a RTC model contributed to the rapid recovery of their
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respective markets and economies. So while the RTC served as the ''public whipping
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boy" in the U.S., the rest of the world used it as a model to address catastrophic banking
problems. Japan's reluctance to embrace a RTC solution created a comparison between
the U.S. and Japan with dramatic results.
The successful response of the FDIC and RTC led to the establishment of a sound
banking environment that enabled the 1990's prosperity. The chart of Year-to-Year
Growth Rate of U.S. & Japan Real GDP shows that from the depths of the S&L crisis and
the 199 1 recession, the U.S. economy rebounded to enjoy a decade of unprecedented
economic growth. Americans saw unemployment drop to thirty-year lows.
Unemployment reached a level that many critics thought was no longer obtainable. The
:financial markets exploded to record highs in a decade of wealth creation unmatched in
more than fifty years. Both Wall Street and Main Street prospered from the :financial
foundation ordered in the years of the RTC's existence. In stark contrast, Japan's
economy languished for more than a decade. Real estate values in Japan fell nearly 60
percent from their 1990 levels. The Japanese stock market endured a bear market of
historic magnitude. That market started down in 1990 and twelve years of unrelenting
decline left the Japan market at less than half its 1989 value, as shown by the chart of the
Nikkei 225 Index. With the U.S. and Japanese models to choose from, most Asian
nations adopted an RTC solution to their bank problems.
The history of the savings and loan industry offers insight into the consequences
of public policy that contradicted the demands of free markets. The political influence of
the industry kept both the regulators and the free markets from closing the insolvent
S&L's. The structural flaws of the industry were unexposed until the inflation of the
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1970's and early 1980's. Rather than allowing market forces to validate the defects of the

industry, political influence brought even greater harm in the form of deregulation and
relaxed controls that allowed government-insured deposits to be used for speculative
investments. The political influence of the S&L lobby apparently blinded many public
authorities to the obligations of the taxpayers as insurers of deposits. The public
accountants involved in the S&L debacle often botched their duty of disclosure in a
manner similar to the failure in 2001 to protect stockholders in the Enron Corporation.
The S&L crisis clearly pointed to the problems in the remuneration of public accountants
that the Enron failure later dramatized.
From the libertarian viewpoint, the entire S&L crisis was avoidable because
government regulation interfered with the workings of the free markets. Left to their own
devices, the S&L's would have gone under in the early 1980's because of market
conditions. But in a story fraught with ironic twists, deregulation of the industry had the
perverse effect of allowing S&L' s to crash catastrophically and incur even greater losses.
On the other hand, government action rather cleanly and quickly corrected the prior
costly government actions. The redeeming measures of the FDIC and RTC in fact cleared
the market of both overvalued and under-productive assets and thereby helped set the
stage for the economic growth of the 1990's.
In fact, the libertarian view commands a small minority of public opinion in the
U.S., and assessment of the S&L crisis must take place in the context of the widely
accepted reality of government regulation of the economy. Since the New Deal, the
American public has supported government in its role to provide security for middle class
consumers. One central element of security provided by the government is the safety of
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bank deposits. Regulation in the form ofdeposit insurance created the framework for the
liability to exist. But regulation in the form ofthe RTC cleaned up the mess in an
effective and expedient manner. In fact, the performance of the RTC and FDIC probably
was far more successful in the cleanup than the working ofthe free market would have
been.
If regulation was inevitable and proved to be more effective than free market
solutions would likely have been in dealing with the S&L crisis, did the American
economy still hold any government-incurred liabilities that might cost taxpayers? Two
obvious ones existed in the Federal National Mortgage Association, popularly known as
Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company, known as Freddie Mac.
These publicly-traded corporations were created to insure that a sufficient amount of
mortgage lending was available to homebuyers. Both received an open line ofcredit to
the U.S. Treasury Department, which gave their operations an implied government
sponsorship. Aware of that government guarantee, the investment community provided
financing for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at lower rates than they would have otherwise
received. Like the S&L's, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have provided huge amounts of
campaign contributions to influential members of Congress and consequently have
always enjoyed political protection in Washington. Their political clout has limited the
discussion about the potential taxpayer liability should either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
become insolvent.
In early 2002, amid an atmosphere of questioning and doubt arising from the
profligate use of derivatives in capital markets and the apparent inadequacy of accounting
practices in the auditing of public corporations brought to light by the Enron failure, The
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Wall Street Journal questioned the advisability of continuing taxpayer guarantees for the
$2.6 trillion in mortgage loans held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Journal raised
these questions without ever mentioning the S&L crisis. Franklin Raines, chairman of
Fannie Mae, responded to the Journal in a manner reminiscent of politicians defending
the S&L's a decade earlier. In a letter to the Journal, Raines self-righteously wrote that
"we are well aware that you disapprove of our public mission to direct additional capital
to the housing market . . . why not come right out and debate whether we have too much
invested in housing and homeownership in America?''87 As clear as they were, as recent
as they had come, the lessons of the S&L crisis appeared lost on some who should have
been listening.
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